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D es~ite ~ngo!~g debat:s a~~u.t the exi~tence, or lack thereof, of a "rev~­, lunon m military affairs, It IS undemable that 21st century warfare will 
differ dramatically from that which characterized the 20th. Perhaps most re-
markable will be the maturation of "information warfare" as a tool of combat.1 
It will challenge existing warfighting doctrine, necessitate a reconceptualization 
of the batdespace, and e}.'Pand the available methods and means of warfare. Of 
particular note will be the impact of information warfare on the principles of in-
temational humanitarian law ... and vice versa. 
Information warfare (IW), in particular computer network attack, has been 
described in detail in this volume and elsewhere. Therefore, only a brief expla-
nation of the typology employed in this chapter is necessary. Information war-
fare is a subset of information operations (10), i.e., "actions taken to affect 
adversary information and information systelllS while defending one's own in-
formation and information systelllS."2 Such operations encompass virtually any 
nonconsensual measures intended to discover, alter, destroy, disrupt, or transfer 
data stored in a computer, manipulated by a computer, or transmitted through a 
computer. They can occur in peacetime, during crises, or at the strategic, opera-
tional, or tactical levels of armed conflict.3 Information operations are distin-
guished by that which is affected or protected-information. 
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IW is narrower. It consists of "infonnation operations conducted during 
time of crisis or conflict to achieve or promote specific objectives over a spe-
cific adversary or adversaries."4 Thus, infonnation warfare is differentiated 
from other operations by the context in which it occurs-crisis or conflict. As 
an example, routine peacetime espionage is an example of an infonnation op-
eration that does not constitute infonnation warfare unless conducted during a 
crisis or hostilities. 
Computer network attacks (CNA), which may amount to IW or merely 10, 
are "operations to disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy infonnation resident in 
computers and computer networks, or the computers and networks them-
selves."5 The essence ofCNA is that, regardless of the context in which it oc-
curs, a data stream is relied on to execute the attack.6 Thus, the means used set 
CNA apart from other forms ofIO. These means vary widely. They include, 
inter alia, gaining access to a computer system so as to acquire control over it, 
transmitting viruses to destroy or alter data, using logic bombs that sit idle in a 
system until triggered on the occasion of a particular occurrence or at a set time, 
insertingwonns that reproduce themselves upon entry to a system thereby over-
loading the network, and employing sniffers to monitor and/or seize data. 
This chapter addresses the use ofCNA during international anned conflict and 
is limited to consideration of the jus in bello, that body oflaw addressing what 
conduct is permissible, or impermissible, during hostilities, irrespective of the le-
gality of the initial resort to force by the belligerents.7 Discussion therefore cen-
ters on the use of CNA in the context of "State-on-State" anned conflict. 
Moreover, the chapter is an effort to explore the lex lata, rather than an exercise 
in considering lex ferenda. While setting forth lex ferenda is an especially worthy 
project as the nature of warfare evolves,8 the goal here is simply to analyze the 
applicability of existing humanitarian law to computer network attack, and 
identify any prescriptive lacunae that may exist therein. 
Applicability of Humanitarian Law to CNA 
The threshold question is whether computer network attack is even subject 
to humanitarian law. To begin with, there is no provision in any humanitarian 
law instrument that directly addresses CNA, or, for that matter, IW or 10; this 
might suggest that CNA is as yet unregulated during anned conflict. Addi-
tionally, it could be argued that the development and employment of CNA 
post-dates existing treaty law, and thus, having not been ,vithin the contem-
plation of the Parties to those instruments, is exempt from the coverage 
thereoE A third possible argument for inapplicability is that humanitarian law 
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is designed for methods and means that are kinetic in nature; since there is little 
that is "physical" in CNA, attacks by computers fall outside the scope of hu-
manitarian law.9 Restated, humanitarian law applies to armed conflict, and 
computer network attack is not "armed." 
The first two possibilities are easily dispensed with. The fact that existing con-
ventions are silent on CNA is of little significance. First, the Martens clause, a 
well-accepted principle of humanitarian law, provides that whenever a situation 
is not covered by an international agreement, "civilians and combatants remain 
under the protection and authority of the principles of international law derived 
from established custom, from the principles of humanity and from the dictates 
of public conscience. "10 By this norm, all occurrences during armed conflict are 
subject to application of humanitarian law principles; there is no lawless void. 
The acceptance of "international custom" as a source oflaw in Article 38 of the 
Statute of the International Court of Justice also demonstrates the fallacy of any 
contention of inapplicability based on the absence of specific lex scripta. 11 
Arguments focusing on the fact that CNA post-dates present prescriptive in-
struments are similarly fallacious. Precisely this line of reasoning was presented 
to the International Court of Justice in Legality oj the Threat or Use oj Nuclear 
Weapons. In its advisory opinion, the court summarily rejected the assertion that 
because humanitarian "principles and rules had evolved prior to the invention of 
nuclear weapons," humanitarian law was inapplicable to them. As the court 
noted, "[i]n the view of the vast majority of States as well as writers there can be 
no doubt as to the applicability of humanitarian law to nuclear weapons."12 
There being no reason to distinguish nuclear from computer weapons, at least 
on the basis of when they were developed vis-a.-vis the entry into force of rele-
vant humanitarian law norms, the same conclusion applies to CNA. Further-
more, a review of new weapons and weapon systems for compliance with 
humanitarian law is a legal, and often a policy, requirement.13 Obviously, this 
would not be so if pre-existing law were inapplicable, ab initio, to nascent meth-
ods and means of warfare. 
This analysis leaves only the third argument for inapplicability of hum ani tar-
ian law to computer network attack-that it is not anned conflict, at least not in 
the absence of conventional hostilities. In exploring this prospect one might re-
flexively reach, as some have, for the UN Charter.14 Article 2(4) of that constitu-
tive instrument proscribes the "use of force," whereas Article 51 allows for 
forceful action in self-defense in the face of an "armed attack." If an act consti-
tutes a "use offorce" or an "armed attack" would it notlogically be subject to the 
laws of "armed conflict," i.e., humanitarian law? If so, all that need be done is to 
determine what actions amount to a use offorce or constitute an armed attack. IS 
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Such an analysis confuses the jus ad bellum with the jus in bello. Articles 2(4) 
and 51, together with Chapter VII of the Charter, are the key prescriptive nonns 
of the jus ad bellum. They govern when it is legitimate under international law (or 
at least Charter law) to resort to force, either as a tool of national policy or in the 
face of another State's decision to do so in pursuit of its own national interests. A 
State that has unlawfully resorted to force may subsequently carry out its opera-
tions in compliance with the jus in bello, which, as mentioned supra, governs 
the actual conduct of hostilities by the parties. For instance, during the 
Falklands/Malvinas conflict Argentina wrongfully invaded British territory, but 
generally abided by the rules of warfare. Similarly, many commentators urge 
that Operation ALLIED FORCE, NATO's 1999 Kosovo bombing campaign, 
violated the jus ad bellum, but was conducted in substantial compliance with the 
laws governing armed conflict.16 Conversely, a State (or its military) that law-
fully resorts to force may subsequently violate humanitarian law principles. As an 
example, it seems clear that Russia is entitled to maintain order in Chechnya; but 
it is equally clear that in doing so its forces have regularly violated both the law of 
non-international armed conflict and human rights law.17 The point is that the 
jus ad bellum and jus in bello are normatively distinct. Professor Leslie Green has 
very pragmatically noted this distinction and its relevance to military personnel: 
Members of the anned forces are not concerned with the manner in which a 
conflict begins, nor whether it is legal or illegal. So far as they are concerned, the 
law of anned conflict comes into operation and they must abide by it from the 
moment that hostilities begin and they are required to participate therein. IS 
The task at hand, therefore, is to query when "hostilities" have begun. 
Tautologically, the answer is that hostilities commence once humanitarian law 
applies. Common Article 2 to the four 1949 Geneva Conventions provides that 
the conventions apply, aside from specific provisions that pertain in peacetime, 
"to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise be-
tween two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not 
recognized by one of them. "19 The 1977 Protocol Additional I, which, like the 
conventions pertains to international armed conflict, adopts the same "armed 
conflict" standard, one that has become an accepted customary law threshold for 
humanitarian law. 20 The fact that the 1977 Protocol Additional II also embraces 
the term "armed conflict,"21 albeit in the context of non-international armed 
conflict, demonstrates that armed conflict is a condition determined by its na-
ture, rather than its participants,2210cation,23 or, as was formerly the case with 
"war," declaration of the belligerents.24 
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It seems relatively clear, then, that humanitarian law is activated through the 
commencement of armed conflict. But what is armed conflict? Commentaries 
published by the International Committee of the Red Cross to the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions and the 1977 Protocols Additional take a very expansive approach 
towards the meaning of the term. The former define armed conflict as "[a]ny 
difference arising between two States and leading to the intervention if armed 
forces . .. even if one of the Parties denies the existence of a state of war. It makes 
no difference how long the conflict lasts, or how much slaughter takes place. "25 
Similarly, Protocol Additional I's commentary provides that "humanitarian 
law ... covers any dispute between two States involving the use if their armed 
forces. Neither the duration of the conflict, nor its intensity, playa role .... "26 
Protocol Additional II's commentary describes armed conflict as "the existence 
of open hostilities between armed forces which are organized to a greater or lesser de-
gree."27 The sine qua non in all three cases is commitment of armed forces. 
But a dispute or difference resulting in the engagement of armed forces can-
not be the sole criterion. Military forces are used on a regular basis against adver-
saries \vithout necessarily producing a state of armed conflict-consider aerial 
reconnaissance/surveillance operations as just one example. Further, it is now 
generally accepted that isolated incidents such as border clashes or small-scale 
raids do not rise to the level of armed conflict as that term is employed in human-
itarian law.28 Accordingly, State practice, supplemented by the writings of pub-
licists, illustrates that Protocol Additional I's dismissal of intensity and duration 
has proven slighdy overstated. 
Instead, the reference to armed forces is more logically understood as a form 
of prescriptive shorthand for activity of a particular nature and intensity. At the 
time the relevant instruments were drafted, armed forces were the entities that 
conducted the contemplated activity at the requisite level ofintensity; by focus-
ing on the armed forces, the intended ends were achieved. Restated, the rele-
vant provisions of the conventions and their commentaries were actor-based 
because citing the actors engaged in the undesirable conduct-armed 
forces-was, at the time, a convenient and reliable method for regulating it. 
And what was that conduct? The logical answer is found in the underlying 
purposes of humanitarian law. A review of its instruments and principles 
makes clear that protecting individuals who are not involved in the hostilities 
direcdy, as well as their property, lies at their core.29 Most notably, protected 
entities include civilians and civilian objects, as well as those who are hors de 
combat (e.g., wounded or captured personnel) or provide humanitarian services 
(e.g., medical personnel). As for the protection they are entided to, it is usually 
framed in terms of injury or death or, in the case of property, damage or 
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destruction. These Geneva law purposes are complemented by Hague law 
norms intended to limit suffering generally through restrictions on certain 
weaponry and methods of warfare. 30 
This excessively abbreviated summarization of humanitarian law's funda-
mental purposes elucidates the term armed conflict. Armed conflict occurs 
when a group takes measures that injure, kill, damage, or destroy. Also included 
are actions intended to cause such results or in which they are the foreseeable 
consequences thereof Because the issue is the jus in bello rather than ad bellum, 
the motivation underlying the actions is irrelevant. So too is their wrongfulness 
or legitimacy. Thus, for example, the party that commences the armed conflict 
by committing such acts may be acting in legitimate anticipatory (or intercep-
tive) self-defense; nevertheless, as long as the actions were intended to injure, 
kill, damage, or destroy, humanitarian law governs them. It should be noted that 
given the current weight of opinion, actions that are sporadic or isolated in 
nature would not suffice. Additionally, because the issue is the law applicable to 
international armed conflict, the relevant actions must be attributable to a 
State.31 
Returning to the topic at hand, and quite aside from ad bellum issues, humani-
tarian law principles apply whenever computer network attacks can be ascribed 
to a State, are more than merely sporadic and isolated incidents, and are either 
intended to cause injury, death, damage, or destruction (and analogous effects), 
or such consequences are foreseeable. This is so even though classic amled force 
is not being employed. By this standard, a computer network attack on a large 
airport's air traffic control system by agents of another State would implicate hu-
manitarian law. So too would an attack intended to destroy oil pipelines by surg-
ing oil through them after taking control of computers governing flow,32 
causing the meltdown of a nuclear reactor by manipulation of its computerized 
nerve center, or using computers to trigger a release of toxic chemicals from pro-
duction and storage facilities. On the other hand, humanitarian law would not 
pertain to disrupting a university intranet, downloading financial records, shut-
ting down Internet access temporarily, or conducting cyber espionage because, 
even if part of a regular campaign of similar acts, if the foreseeable consequences 
would not include injury, death, damage, or destruction. 
It should be apparent that, given advances in methods and means of warfare, 
especially information warfare, it is no longer sufficient to apply an actor-based 
threshold for application of humanitarian law; instead, a consequence-based 
one is more appropriate. This is hardly a jurisprudential epiphany. No one 
would deny, for instance, that biological or chemical warfare (which does not 
involve delivery by kinetic weapons) is subject to humanitarian law. A 
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consequence-based threshold is also supported by the fact that once anned 
conflict has commenced (and except for prohibitions relevant to particular 
weapons), the means by which injury, death, damage or destruction are pro-
duced have no bearing on the legality of the causal act. Intentionally targeting a 
civilian or other protected persons or objects is unlawful irrespective of the 
method or means used. Starvation, suffocation, beating, shooting, bombing, 
even cyber attack-all are subject to humanitarian law based on the fact that a 
particular consequence results. That this is so counters any assertion that, 
standing alone, cyber attacks are not subject to humanitarian law because they 
are not "anned" force. On the contrary, they mayor may not be, depending 
on their nature and likely consequences. 
Computer Network Attack Targets 
As has been discussed, computer network attacks are subject to humanitarian 
law if they are part and parcel of either a classic conflict or a "cyber war" in which 
injury, death, damage, or destruction are intended or foreseeable. This being so, 
it is necessary to consider the targets against which computer network attacks 
may be directed. 
A useful starting point is to frame the conduct that is subject to the prescrip-
tive norms governing targeting. Because most relevant Protocol Additional I 
provisions articulate standards applicable to Parties and non-Parties (as a restate-
ment of binding customary law) alike, that instrument serves as an apt point of 
departure.33 Article 48, the basic rule governing the protection of the civilian 
population, provides that "Parties to the conflict ... shall direct their operations 
only against military objectives. "34 On its face, Article 48 would seem to rule out 
any military operation, including CNA, directed against other than purely mili-
tary objectives. In fact, it does not. In subsequent articles, proscriptions are rou-
tinely expressed in terms of "attacks." Thus, "the civilian population as such, as 
well as individual civilians, shall not be the object of attack"35; "civilian objects 
shall not be the object of attack"36; "indiscriminate attacks are forbidden"37; "at-
tacks shall be limited strictly to military objectives"38; and so forth. The tenn is 
expressly defined in Article 49: '''Attacks' means acts of violence against the ad-
versary, whether in offence or in defence." As a general matter then, the prohi-
bition is not so much on targeting non-military objectives as it is on attacking 
them, specifically through the use of violence. This interpretation is supported 
by the text of Article 51, which sets forth the general principle that the" civilian 
population and individual civilians shall enjoy general protection against dangers 
arising from military operations," and which prohibits "acts or threats of violence 
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the primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian popula-
tion,"39 as well as the commentary to Article 48, which notes that "the word 
'operation' should be understood in the context of the whole of the Section; it 
refers to military operations during which violence is used."4o 
In light of this interpretation, does computer network attack fall outside the 
ambit of "attacks" because it does not employ violence? No, and for precisely 
the same reason that armed attacks can include cyber attacks. "Attacks" is a term 
of prescriptive shorthand intended to address specific consequences. It is clear 
that what the relevant provisions hope to accomplish is shielding protected indi-
viduals from injury or death and protected objects from damage or destruction. 
To the extent the term "violence" is explicative, it must be considered in the 
sense of violent consequences rather than violent acts. Significant human physical 
or mental suffering41 is logically included in the concept of injury; permanent 
loss of assets, for instance money, stock, etc., direcdy transferable into tangible 
property likewise comprises damage or destruction. The point is that inconve-
nience, harassment, or mere diminishment in quality of life does not suffice; hu-
man suffering is the requisite criterion. As an example, a major disruption of the 
stock market or banking system might effectively collapse the economy and re-
sult in widespread unemployment, hunger, mental anguish, etc., a reality tragi-
cally demonstrated during the Depression of the 1930s. Ifit did cause this level of 
suffering, the CNA would constitute an attack, as that term is understood in hu-
manitarian law. 
Other articles within the section sustain this reading. For instance, the rules of 
proportionality speak of "loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civil-
ians objects, or a combination thereof,"42 those relating to protection of the en-
vironment refer to "widespread, long-term, and severe damage,"43 and the 
protection of dams, dykes, and nuclear electrical generating stations is framed in 
terms of "severe losses among the civilian population."44 Furthermore, during 
the negotiation of Protocol Additional I, the issue of whether laying landrnines 
constituted an attack arose. Most agreed that it did because "there is an attack 
whenever a person is direcdy endangered by a mine laid. "45 By analogy, a com-
puter network attack which foreseeably endangers protected persons or prop-
erty would amount to an attack. 
Return now to Article 48. In the context of computer network attack, and as 
a general rule (various other specific prohibitions are discussed infra), the article 
would prohibit those CNA operations directed against non-military objectives 
that are intended to, or would foreseeably, cause injury, death, damage, or de-
struction. Unless otherwise prohibited by specific provisions of humanitarian 
law, CNA operations unlikely to result in the aforementioned consequences are 
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pennissible against non-military objectives, such as the population.46 As a result 
of this distinction, the need to carefully aSsess whether or not an infonnation 
warfare operation is oris not an "attack" is gready heightened. In the past, analy-
sis of this matter approximated a res ipsa [oquitor approach. However, CNA is 
much more ambiguous than traditional military operations, thereby demanding 
a more challenging consequence-based consideration. 
While CNA does dramatically expand the possibilities for "targeting" (but 
not attacking) non-military objectives, it is unfair to characterize this as a weak-
ening of the prescriptive architecture. Instead, it simply represents an expansion 
of pennissible methods and means resulting from advances in technology; exist-
ing norms remain intact. Recall, for example, that psychological operations di-
rected against the civilian population that cause no physical hann are entirely 
pennissible, so long as they are not intended to terrorize.47 This is so whether the 
motivation for the operations is military in nature or not. Nevertheless, although 
the objective regime is a constant, the advent ofCNA reveals a nonnative lacuna 
that, unless filled, will inevitably result in an expansion of war's impact on the ci-
vilian population. 
Assuming a CNA operation is an "attack," what can be targeted? Ana-
lytically, potential targets can be classified into three broad categories: 1) com-
batants and military objectives; 2) civilians and civilian objects; and 3) dual-use 
objects. Moreover, particular types of potential targets enjoy specific protection. 
It is useful to address each grouping separately. 
Combatants and military objectives: Combatants and military objectives are by 
nature valid targets and may be direcdy attacked as long as the method used, as 
discussed in the next section, is consistent with humanitarian law restrictions. 
Those who plan or decide on attacks have an affinnative duty to "do everything 
feasible" to verify that intended targets are legitimate, i.e., that they do not enjoy 
immunity from attack under humanitarian law.48 
A combatant is a member of the armed forces other than medical personnel 
and chaplains; anned forces include "all organized anned forces, groups and 
units which are under a command responsible to [a Party to the conflict] for the 
conduct ofits subordinates .... [They must] be subject to an internal disciplinary 
system which, inter alia, shall enforce compliance with the rules of international 
law applicable in anned conflict. "49 Directing computer network attacks against 
combatants, for instance by causing a military air traffic control system to trans-
mit false navigational infonnation in order to cause a military troop transport to 
crash, is clearly pennissible. 
Military objectives are defined in Article 52 of Protocol Additional I as "those 
objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective 
195 
Michael N. Schmitt 
contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or 
neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite advan-
tage. "50 Military equipment and facilities, other than medical and religious 
items, are clearly military objectives, and thereby subject to direct computer net-
work attack. However, determining which objects are military objectives 
beyond these obvious exemplars is often difficult. 51 The problem lies in ascer-
taining the required nexus between the object to be attacked and military 
operations. 
The crux of the dilemma is interpretation of the terms" effective" and" defi-
nite." Some, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, define 
them very narrowly. In the ICRC commentary to the protocol, effective con-
tribution includes objects" directly used by the armed forces" (e.g., weapons and 
equipment), locations of "special importance for military operations" (e.g., 
bridges), and objects intended for use or being used for military purposes. 52 As to 
"definite military advantage," the commentary excludes attacks that offer only a 
"potential or indeterminate" advantage. 53 By contrast, the United States, which 
does not dispute the wording of the definition, would include economic targets 
that "indirectly but effectively support and sustain the enemy's war-fighting ca-
pability," a particularly expansive interpretation.54 
This difference has interesting implications for computer network attack. 
Can a banking system be attacked because wealth underpins a military's 
sustainability? What about the ministry responsible for taxation? The stock market? 
Are attacks on brokerage firms acceptable because they will undermine willing-
ness to invest in the economy? If a country disproportionately relies on a particu-
lar industry to provide export income (e.g., oil), can computer network attack 
be used to disrupt production and distribution? The issue of striking economic 
targets is a particularly acute one because the operation of most is computer in-
tense in nature, and thereby very appealing to information warfare targeteers. 
The threshold issue, recalling the discussion supra, is whether or not the attack 
would cause injury, death, damage, or destruction. Once this determination is 
made, the differing interpretations of military objective would come into play, 
in all likelihood leading to disparate results on the legitimacy of striking the tar-
get. On the other hand, if the operation were designed to cause, e.g., mere in-
convenience, it would not rise to the level of an attack and would thus be 
permissible regardless of the target's nexus, or lack thereof, to military opera-
tions. For instance, if the Serbian State television station had been targeted by 
CNA rather than kinetic weapons during NATO strikes on Belgrade in April 
1999, there might well have been no consequent injury, death, damage, or de-
struction; in that circumstance, criticism on the basis that a civilian target had 
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been hit would likely have fallen on deaf ears, thereby probably avoiding the 
negative publicity that resulted, as well as the pending litigation in the European 
Court of Human Rights.55 
Civilians and dvilian objects: Civilians are those not considered combatants,56 
whereas a civilian object is one that is not a military objective. 57 The prohibition 
on attacking civilians and civilian objects is nearly absolute. Specifically, Proto-
col Additional I provides: 
Article 51.2. The civilian population, as such, as well as individual civilians shall 
not be the object of attack. Acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of 
which is to spread terror among the civilian population are prohibited. 
Article 52. Civilian objects shall not be the object of attack or of reprisals. 58 
Doubts as to the character of an object or individual are to be resolved in :favor 
of finding civilian status. 59 Again, in the case of computer network attack, the 
threshold question is whether or not the attack is intended to, or forseeably will, 
cause injury, death, damage, or destruction; if so, the prohibitions set forth ear-
lier, which undeniably restate existing customary law, apply. 
Unfortunately, the norms, albeit clear on their face, are subject to interpretive 
difficulties. The differing standards for distinguishing civilian objects from mili-
tary objectives have already been highlighted. Similar disparities surround when 
a civilian may be attacked. Protocol Additional I allows for this possibility only 
in the case of a civilian taking a "direct part in hostilities," a standard described in 
the commentary as "acts of war which by their nature or purpose are likely to 
cause actual harm to the personnel or equipment of the enemy armed forces. "60 
This is the illegal combatant problem. Some would limit civilian immunity even 
more severely by, for instance, characterizing mission-essential civilians work-
ing at a base during hostilities, though not engaged direcdy in acts of war, as le-
gitimate targets.61 
In the context of information operations, the civilian issue is an important 
one. Some countries have elected to contract out information warfare func-
tions, whether those functions involve the maintenance of assets or the conduct 
of operations. Moreover, computer network attack is a function that may be 
tasked to government agencies other than the military. In the event civilian con-
tractors or non-military personnel are in a support role that is essential to the 
conduct of operations, for instance maintaining CNA equipment, by the latter 
interpretation they would be direcdy targetable. Further, because they are valid 
targets, any injury caused them would not be calculated when assessing whether 
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an attack is proportional (see discussion infra). On the other hand, narrowly ap-
plying the "direct part in hostilities" standard would preserve the protection 
they enjoy as civilians, though if captured they would be entided to prisoner of 
war status as persons "accompanying the armed forces."62 
Should civilians engage in computer network attack themselves, the problem 
becomes more complex. If the CNA results, or foreseeably could result, in in-
jury, death, damage, or destruction, then the "perpetrators" would be illegal 
combatants. This status attaches because they have taken a direct part in hostili-
ties without complying with the criteria for characterization as a combatant. As 
illegal combatants, they may be direcdy attacked, any injury suffered by them 
would be irrelevant in a proportionality calculation, and in the event of their 
capture they would not be entided to prisoner of war status. 
By contrast, if the civilians involved were conducting computer network op-
erations that did not rise to the level of "attacks, " they would not be illegal com-
batants because they would have committed no "acts of war that by their nature 
or purpose are likely to cause actual harm to the personnel or equipment of the 
enemy armed forces." Their civilian status and its corresponding protections 
would remain intact. Nevertheless, as with support personnel, if captured while 
attached to a military unit and accompanying that unit, these civilians would be 
classed as prisoners of war. 63 Of course, the facility and equipment being used to 
conduct the operations might well be valid military objectives and, as a result, be 
subject to attack; but the operators themselves could not be direcdy attacked. 
As should be apparent, the use of civilians, whether contractors or govern-
ment employees, is fraught with legal pitfalls. Clearly, a prudent approach would 
be to employ military personnel for information warfare purposes. 
Dual-use objects: A dual-use object is one that serves both civilian and military 
purposes. Examples of common dual-use objects (or objectives) include air-
ports, rail lines, electrical systems, communications systems, factories that pro-
duce items for both the military and the civilian population, and satellites such as 
INTELSAT, EUROSAT andARABSAT. If an object is being used for military 
purposes, it is a military objective vulnerable to attack, including computer net-
work attack. This is true even if the military purposes are secondary to the civil-
ian ones. 
Several caveats are in order. First, whether or not an object is a military objec-
tive may tum on whether the narrow or broad definition of the term, a matter 
discussed supra, is used. Second, whether an object is dual-use, and therefore a 
military objective, will depend on the nature of the specific conflict. An airfield 
may be utilized for logistics purposes in one conflict, but serve no military func-
tion in another. Third, an object that has the potential for military usage, but is 
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presently solely used for civilian purposes, is a military objective if the likelihood 
of use is reasonable and not remote in the context of the particular conflict un-
derway. Finally, dual-use objects must be carefully measured against the require-
ments of discrimination and proportionality, discussed infra, because by 
definition an attack thereon risks collateral damage and incidental injury to civil-
ians or civilian objects. 
Specffically protected objects: In addition to the general rules regarding the protec-
tion of the civilian population, certain objects enjoy specific protection. A contro-
versial category of specially protected objects is dams, dikes, and nuclear electrical 
generating stations. Because of their reliance on computer and computer net-
works, such facilities are especially vulnerable to CNA. Article 56 of Protocol Ad-
ditional I, a provision opposed by the United States, forbids an attack on these 
facilities if the attack might "cause the release of dangerous forces [e.g., water or 
radioactivity] and consequent severe losses among the civilian population."64 This 
prohibition applies even if they are military objectives. Interestingly, CNA offers a 
fairly reliable means of neutralizing such facilities without risking the release of 
dangerous forces, a difficult task when using kinetic weapons. 
Conducting attacks that starve the civilian population or otherwise deny it 
"indispensable objects,"65 even if enemy armed forces are the intended "vic-
tims," is prohibited.66 Indispensable objects include such items as "foodstuffi, 
crops, livestock, or drinking water. Applying this restriction, computer net-
works attacks against, for instance, a food storage and distribution system or a 
water treatment plant serving the civilian population would be impermissible 
even if military forces also rely on them. 
Protocol Additional I further prohibits military operations likely to cause 
widespread, long-term, and severe damage to the environment,67 although the 
United States does not recognize the provision as a restatement of customary 
law. Computer network attacks might conceivably cause such devastation. An 
attack on a nuclear reactor could result in a meltdown of its core and consequent 
release of radioactivity. Similarly, CNA could be used to release chemicals from 
a storage or production facility or rupture a major oil pipeline. Many other pos-
sibilities for the causation of environmental damage through CNA exist. It is im-
portant to note that the prohibition applies regardless of whether or not the 
attack is targeted against a valid military objective and even if it complies with 
the principle of proportionality. Once the requisite quantum of damage is ex-
pected to occur, the operation is prohibited. 
There are a number of other objects, persons, and activities that enjoy special 
protected status, and which are susceptible to computer network attack, but 
which do not present unique CNA opportunities or challenges. For example, 
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military and civilian medical units and supplies are exempt from attack unless be-
ing used for military purposes;68 the same is generally true of medical transport.69 
So too are cultural objects, places ofworship,70 and civil defense shelters, facili-
ties, and material.71 Additionally, humanitarian relief activities must not be in-
terfered with.72 By these prohibitions, for example, a computer network attack 
to alter blood type information in a hospital's data bank, deny power to a bomb 
shelter, or misroute humanitarian relief supplies would all be unlawful. Of 
course, misuse of protected items or locations for military purposes renders them 
valid military objectives that may be attacked. 
Finally, there are limitations on striking certain objects or individuals in repri-
sal, including reprisals by computer network attack. Reprisals are othenvise un-
lawful actions taken during armed conflict in response to an adversary's own 
unlawful conduct. They must be designed solely to cause the adversary to act 
lawfully, be preceded by a warning (if feasible), be proportionate to the adver-
sary's violation, and cease as soon as the other side complies with the legallimita-
tions on its conduct. The right to conduct reprisals has been severely restricted in 
treaty law, much of which expresses customary law. There are specific prohibi-
tions on reprisals conducted against civilians; prisoners of war; the wounded, 
sick, and shipwrecked; medical and religious personnel and their equipment; 
protected buildings, equipment, and vessels; civilian objects; cultural objects; 
objects indispensable for the survival of the civilian population; works contain-
ing dangerous forces; and the environment.73 Essentially, this leaves only com-
batants and military objectives subject to reprisals. Of course, in most cases a 
computer network attack conducted against them would be lawful at any rate.74 
In fairness, it should be acknowledged that certain countries argue that the 
Protocol Additional I restrictions on reprisals fail to reflect customary law. The 
United States, while accepting that most reprisals against civilians would be in-
appropriate (and illegitimate), asserts that the absolute prohibition thereon "re-
moves a significant deterrent that presently protects civilians and other war 
victims on all sides of the conflict."75 The United Kingdom issued a reservation 
on precisely the same point when it became a Party to the protocoI.76 For these 
and other countries that have adopted this position, reprisatory computer net-
work attacks are issues of policy, not law. 
Limits on Striking Legitimate Targets 
The core prescriptions on striking legitimate targets are based in the principle 
of discrimination.77 It is this principle which most clearly e:h."}Jresses humanitar-
ian law's balancing of State-centric interests in resorting to force against the 
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more broadly based humanitarian interest in shielding non-participants from the 
effects of what is, at best, an unfortunate necessity. 
Discrimination is bifurcated in nature. Applied to weapons, it limits the use of 
those that are incapable of distinguishing between combatants and military ob-
jectives on the one hand and civilians, civilian objects, and other protected enti-
ties on the other. Applied to tactics and the use of weapons, it requires an effort 
to distinguish between the two categories when conducting military operations. 
Protocol Additional I articulates this difference in Article 51.4: 
Indiscriminate attacks are: (a) those which are not directed at a specific military 
objective; (b) those which employ a method or means of combat which cannot be 
directed at a specific military objective; or (c) those which employ a method or 
means of combat the effects of which cannot be limited as required by this 
Protocol; and consequendy, in each such case, are of a nature to strike military 
objectives and civilians or civilian objects without distinction. 
Subparagraph (a) refers to indiscriminate use, whereas (b) and (c) describe 
indiscriminate weapons. The indiscriminate use aspect of discrimination consists 
of three related components-rustinction, proportionality, and minimizing 
collateral damage and incidental injuryJ8 
Illdiscrimillate weapom: Computer network attacks are mounted by a weapon 
system consisting of a computer, computer code, and a means by which that 
code is transmitted. Obviously, the computer itself is not indiscriminate for it 
can very discretely send code to particular computers and networks. The send-
ing of e-mail is an apt example. By contrast, code can be written that is very, 
perhaps intentionally, indiscriminate. The classic example is a virus that passes 
from computer to computer free from the control ofits originator. Because the 
code, even if an uncontrollable virus, can be targeted at particular military objec-
tives, it is not indiscriminate on the basis that it cannot be directed. However, 
such code may be indiscriminate on the ground that its dfects cannot be limited. 
In many cases, once viral code is launched against a target computer or network, 
the attacker will have no way to limit its subsequent retransmission. This may be 
true even in a closed network, for the virus could, as an example, be transferred 
into it by diskette. Simply put, malicious code likely to be uncontrollably spread 
throughout civilian systems is prohibited as an indiscriminate weapon. 
One must be careful not to overstate the restriction. Note that Article 51.4 
cites "methods and means of combat." A means of combat is defined in Proto-
col Additional I's commentary as a "weapon," whereas a method of combat is 
the way a weapon is usedJ9 The plain meaning of "weapon" is something that 
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can be used to attack an adversary. Drawing on the analysis supra regarding the 
humanitarian law term "attacks," computer code is only part of a weapon sys-
tem when it can cause the effects encompassed in that term-injury, death, 
damage, and destruction (including related effects like severe mental suffering, 
terror, suffering, etc.). In the event it cannot, it is not part of a weapon system, 
and thus would not be prohibited, at least not on the ground that it is 
indiscriminate. 
Distinction: The prindple of distinction, unquestionably part of customary hu-
manitarian law, is set forth in Protocol Additional I, Article 48: "[T]he Parties to 
the conflict shall at all times distinguish between the civilian population and 
combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly 
shall direct their operations only against military objectives." Whereas the pro-
hibition on attacking civilians direcdy rendered a specific category of potential 
targets off-limits, the distinction requirement extends protection to cases in 
which an attack may not be directed against civilian or civilian objectives specifi-
cally, but in which there is a high likelihood of striking them nonetheless. An ex-
ample would be firing a weapon, though capable of being aimed, blindly. 
This is a particularly relevant prohibition in the context of computer network 
attack. For example, it would embrace situations where it is possible to dis-
cretely target a military objective through a particular means of CNA, but in-
stead a broad attack likely to affect civilian systems is launched. Such an attack 
would be analogous to the Iraqi SCUD attacks against Saudi and Israeli popula-
tion centers during the 1990-91 Persian Gulf War.so The SCUD is not an in-
herendy indiscriminate weapon. Indeed, it is easily capable ofbeing aimed with 
sufficient accuracy against, for instance, military formations in the desert. How-
ever, use of SCUDS against population centers was indiscriminate even if the 
Iraqi intent was to strike military objectives situated therein; the likelihood of 
striking protected persons and objects so outweighed that of hitting legitimate 
, targets that the use was improper. Given the interconnectivity of computer sys-
tems today, computer network attacks could readily be launched in an analo-
gous fashion. 
Proportionality: Sdenter distinguishes the principle of proportionality from that 
of distinction. Distinction limits direct attacks on protected persons or objects 
and those in which there is culpable disregard for civilian consequences. By con-
trast, proportionality governs those situations in which harm to protected per-
sons or objects is the foreseeable consequence of an attack, but not its intended 
purpose. The principle is most often violated (sometimes in an unintended but 
culpably negligent fashion) as a result of: 1) lack of sufficient knowledge or un-
derstanding of what is being attacked; 2) an inability to surgically craft the 
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amount of "force" being applied against a target; and 3) the inability to ensure 
the weapon strikes precisely the right aim point. 81 All three pitfalls could surface 
in the context of computer network attack. 
As set forth in Protocol Additional I, an attack is indiscriminate as violative of 
the principle of proportionality when it "may be expected to cause incidental 
loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combina-
tion thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct 
military advantage anticipated."82 A concrete and direct advantage is "substan-
tial and relatively closer;] ... advantages which are hardly perceptible and those 
which would only appear in the long term should be disregarded. "83 Moreover, 
the advantage calculated is that resulting from the overall operation, not the in-
dividual attack itse1£84 
Basically, the principle of proportionality mandates a balancing test-one that 
is especially difficult to conduct because differing entities (suffering and damage 
v. military advantage) are being compared against each other in the absence of a 
common system of valuation. How should civilian passenger lives be weighed 
against military aircraft in a computer network attack on an air traffic control sys-
tem? How much human suffering is acceptable when shutting down an electri-
cal grid that serves both military and civilian purposes? Can computer network 
attacks be conducted against telecommunications if they result in degrading 
emergency response services for the civilian population? Complicating matters 
is the fact that the answers to these and similar questions, assuming there are any 
"right" answers, is contextual because the military advantage resulting from an 
attack always depends on the state of hostilities at the time.85 Acknowledging the 
difficulty involved in making these types of determinations, the Protocol Addi-
tional I commentary notes that" [p Jutting these provisions into practice ... will 
require complete good faith on the part of the belligerents, as well as the desire to 
conform with the general principle of respect for the civilian population."86 
Further complicating matters is the issue of reverberating effects, i.e., those 
effects not direcdy and immediately caused by the attack, but nevertheless the 
product thereof-it is the problem of the effects caused by the effects of an at-
tack. The most cited example involves the attack on the Iraqi electrical grid 
during the 1991 Persian Gulf War. Although it successfully disrupted Iraqi 
command and control, the attack also denied electricity to the civilian popula-
tion (a "first-tier" effect), thereby affecting hospitals, refrigeration, emergency 
response, etc. Similarly, when NATO struck at Yugoslavia's electrical supply 
network during Operation ALLIED FORCE, one consequence was shutting 
down drinking water pumping stations.87 Such attacks set off "second-tier" 
suffering (a reverberating effect) of the population. Obviously, precisely the 
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same effects could have resulted had the attacks been conducted through 
CNA. Indeed, the problem of reverberating effects looms much larger in com-
puter network than kinetic attacks due to the interconnectivity of computers, 
particularly that between military and civilian systems. 
Reverberating effects bear on proportionality analysis because they must be 
considered when balancing collateral damage and incidental injury against 
military advantage. Unfortunately, and whether reverberating or direct, it is 
difficult to assess such damage and injury when caused by computer network 
attack absent an understanding of how the computer systems involved function 
and to which other systems they are linked. Despite this obstacle, planners and 
decision-makers have an affirmative duty to attempt to avoid collateral damage 
and incidental injury whenever feasible, a duty that necessarily implies an effort 
to ascertain the resultant damage or injury from an attack. 88 Given the complex-
ity of computer network attack, the high likelihood of an impact on civilian sys-
tems, and the relatively low understanding of its nature and effects on the part of 
those charged with ordering the attacks, computer e}.l'erts will have to be avail-
able to assess potential collateral and incidental effects throughout the mission 
planning process.89 Additionally, modeling and simulation, like that already 
conducted for nuclear weapons, would prove invaluable in identifying possible 
reverberating effects; conducting them prior to the outbreak of hostilities-free 
from the fog, friction, and pace of war-would be well advised. 
Minimizing collateral damage and incidental injury: Proportionality determina-
tions establish whether a military objective may be attacked at all. However, 
even if the selected target is legitimate and the planned attack thereon would be 
proportional, the attacker has an obligation to select that method or means of 
warfare likely to cause the least collateral damage and incidental injury, all other 
things being equal (such as risk to the forces conducting the attack, likelihood of 
success, weapons inventory, etc.).90 Additionally, whenever a choice is pre-
sented between military objectives that can be attacked to achieve a desired 
result, the attack which risks the least collateral damage and incidental injury 
must be chosen.91 
The availability of computer network attack actually expands the options for 
minimizing collateral damage and incidental injury. Whereas in the past physical 
destruction may have been necessary to neutralize a target's contribution to the 
enemy's efforts, now it may be possible to simply "tum it off." For instance, 
rather than bombing an airfield, air traffic control can be interrupted. The same 
is true of power production and distribution systems, communications, indus-
trial plants, and so forth. Those who plan and execute such operations must still 
be concerned about collateral damage, incidental injury, and reverberating 
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effects (consider the Iraqi electric grid example supra), but the risks associated 
with conducting classic kinetic warfare are mitigated significandy through 
CNA. Additionally, depending on the desired result, it may be possible to sim-
ply interrupt operation of the target. This tactic would be particularly attractive 
in the case of dual-use objectives. Consider an electrical grid. It might only be 
militarily necessary to shut the system down for a short period, for example, im-
mediately preceding and during an assault. The system could be brought back up 
as soon as the pressing need for its interruption passed, thereby limiting the nega-
tive effects on the civilian population. Along the same lines, because targets are 
not physically damaged, and thus do not need to be repaired or rebuilt, the civil-
ian population's return to normalcy at the end of the conflict would be 
facilitated. 
There is, from a humanitarian point of view, one theoretical downside to the 
fact that CNA may sometimes cause less collateral damage and incidental injury 
than kinetic attacks-it might actually encourage attacks. This would be so in 
the case of an attack that could not pass the proportionality test if conducted 
kinetically, but could if accomplished by computer network attack. Should the 
CNA result in any collateral damage or incidental injury (albeit not enough to 
outweigh the resulting military advantage), the net result would be greater civil-
ian suffering. While this is true, the better question from the humanitarian point 
of view is whether CNA causes more or less collateral damage and incidental in-
jury overall, not merely as to a single operation. So long as the various limitations 
of the principle of discrimination are complied with, and without the benefit of a 
track record to draw on in making the assertion, it would seem that in humani-
tarian terms computer network attack is probably a step forward. 
Perfidy: Although the core normative constraints on computer network at-
tack derive from the principle of discrimination, several other related aspects of 
humanitarian law are implicated by this new means of warfare. One is the prohi-
bition on perfidy. Perfidy is the feigning of protected status in order to take ad-
vantage of an adversary. Examples include pretending to be wounded or sick, to 
enjoy non-combatant status, or to surrender, and improperly displaying symbols 
that signifY protected status, such as the red cross or red crescent. Perfidy is dis-
tinguished from ruses, which are acts intended to mislead an adversary and cause 
him to act recklessly, but which do not involve false claims of protected status. 
Ruses are lawful. 
Information warfare, including computer network attack, opens many op-
portunities for ruses and perfidy. This is because both techniques are intended to 
convey false information. For instance, lawful ruses might include transmitting 
false data, meant to be intercepted by an adversary, regarding troop disposition 
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or movements. Alternatively, it might involve altering data in an adversary's in-
telligence databases, sending messages to enemy headquarters purporting to be 
from subordinate units, or passing instructions to subordinate units that appear 
to be from their headquarters. 92 All such activities would be perfectly legitimate. 
On the other hand, any action intended to mislead the enemy into believing 
that one's forces enjoyed protected status in order to kill, injure, or capture the 
enemy would be illegitimate.93 For instance, medical units and transports may 
use codes and signals established by the International Telecommunications 
Union, the International Civil Aviation Organization, and the International 
Maritime Consultative Orgaci.zation to identifY themselves.94 Falsely transmit-
ting such code/signals or, a more likely prospect in the computer network attack 
context, causing adversary systems to reflect receipt of such signals would be 
clear examples of perfidy. The Department of Defense has also opined that using 
"computer 'morphing' techniques to create an image of the enemy's chief of 
state informing his troops that an armistice or cease-fire agreement had been 
signed" would be a war crime if false.95 
An interesting prospect would be routing a computer network attack 
through civilian systems, or otherwise feigning a civilian source. This might be 
done to later mask the source of attack or to inspire confidence in the target that 
the transmission was benign. Doing so would be prohibited both by the Proto-
col Additional I and customary law.96 This is a very sensible restriction because a 
response to an attack apparently originating from a civilian source could be 
kinetic in nature. 
It must be noted that the protocol's restriction on perfidy is limited to con-
duct calculated to facilitate killing, injuring, or capturing an adversary. The 
commentary thereto notes this limitation, but suggests that "there is more to 
an international treaty than the literal reading of all the words in the document 
may suggest; it represents one step forward in the ongoing evolution in rela-
tions between States."97 Be that as it may, as the law stands today it would be 
permissible to disguise information warfare operations as civilian in origin if 
they were not related to killing, injuring, or capturing one's adversary. This 
standard is consistent with that employed supra regarding "armed" conflict and 
"attack." Moreover, the prohibition on misuse of protective codes and signals, 
such as those designed to identifY medical facilities, are absolute, i.e., they ap-
ply regardless of the abuser's intent. As an example, usage merely to avoid at-
tack is forbidden. 
Civilian Shields: In theory, a computer attack might utilize a civilian net-
work to shield itself against a response, either kinetic or through a counter-
cyber attack. If the latter did not cause death or injury to civilians or damage 
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or destruction of protected objects, and therefore was not an "attack" in the 
humanitarian law sense, it would be permissible. On the other hand, ifit might 
cause collateral damage or incidental injury, then any such effects on the civil-
ian population would have to be considered in a proportionality analysis; civil-
ians and civilian objects do not lose the protections of the law of armed conflict 
by the wrongful acts of others. Of course, the use of civilian shields is itself 
wrongful;98 the party that subjects the civilian population or protected objects 
to risk by using them as shields is culpable under humanitarian law. This prin-
ciple applies whether the attack is kinetic or computer in nature. 
Mercenaries: Since computer network attacks can amount to both armed con-
flict and, in individual cases, an attack, restrictions on mercenaries may apply to 
those who conduct them. Mercenaries are specifically addressed in Protocol 
Additional I, although the restrictions contained therein are not customary in 
nature, a position strengthened by the absence of any mention of mercenaries in 
the Statute of the International Criminal Court. 
By Article 47 of the protocol, a mercenary is any person who: 
(a) is specially recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in an armed conflict; 
(b) does, in fact, take a direct part in the hostilities; 
(c) is motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially by the desire for private 
gain and, in fact, is promised, by or on behalf of a Party to the conflict, material 
compensation substantially in excess of that promised or paid to combatants of 
similar ranks and functions in the armed forces of that Party; 
(d) is neither a national of a Party to the conflict nor a resident of territory 
controlled by a Party to the conflict; 
(e) is not a member of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict; and 
(f) has not been sent by a State which is not a Party to the conflict on official duty as 
a member of its armed forces.99 
While Protocol Additional I does not actually prohibit mercenarism, because 
they are not combatants, mercenaries are not entitled to prisoner of war status. 
Therefore, like any other noncombatant who directly engages in hostilities, they 
may be tried under the domestic law of the State that captures them.100 
Given the complexity of conducting computer network attacks, it is quite 
conceivable that States might hire non-nationals possessing the requisite exper-
tise to mount them. If the CNA amount to an "attack," these individuals 
would be taking a "direct part in the hostilities." Assuming they met the other 
qualifying criteria for mercenaries, the Protocol Additional I provisions would 
apply. Interestingly, there is a financial incentive to outsource CNA because in 
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many cases hiring computer attack expertise would be far more cost-effective 
than hiring conventional attack mercenaries or even acquiring weapons for 
one's own forces. 
Conclusion 
By and large, as information warfare capabilities increase, existing humanitar-
ian prescriptive norms will suffice to maintain the protection civilians, civilian 
objects, and other protected entities enjoy. However, certain novel aspects of 
CNA do pose new and sometimes troubling quandaries. The unease over the 
use of cyber warfare during NATO's campaign against Yugoslavia in 1999 is 
compelling evidence that the question of how humanitarian law bears on CNA 
remains unsetded.101 
First, in order to apply extant norms to CNA, it is necessary to accept vari-
ous interpretive premises. Most important are the consequence-based inter-
pretations of "armed conflict" and "attack." Absent such understandings, the 
applicability, and therefore adequacy, of present-day humanitarian law princi-
ples would fall into question. Interestingly, consideration of computer net-
work attack in the context of the jus ad bellum also leads to consequence-based 
interpretation. 102 
Second, even accepting the parameters resulting from the interpretations sug-
gested, normative lacunae exist. Most notably, attacks against civilians and civil-
ian objects that do not injure, kill, damage, or destroy (or otherwise produce the 
requisite level of suffering) are by and large permissible. Given that kinetic at-
tacks usually have such effects, civilians and civilian objects enjoy broad protec-
tion during conventional military operations. However, computer network 
attack, because it may not amount to an attack, opens up many possibilities for 
targeting otherwise protected persons and objects. The incentive for conducting 
such operations grows in relation to the extent to which the "war aims" of the 
party conducting the CNA are coercive in nature; the desire to, e.g., "tum out 
the lights" to a civilian population in order motivate it to pressure its leadership 
to take, or desist from taking, a particular course of conduct (a step suggested by 
NATO's air commander during Operation ALLIED FORCE) will grow as the 
means for doing so expand.103 This is an especially negative reality in humanitar-
ian terms. 
Third, and more encouraging, is the fact that CNA may make it possible to 
achieve desired military objectives with less collateral damage and incidental in-
jury than in traditional kinetic attacks. Indeed, in certain cases, military com-
manders will be obligated to employ their cyber assets in lieu of kinetic weapons 
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when collateral and incidental effects can be limited. 104 That said, it will be criti-
cally important to carefully analyze the effects of such operations, particularly 
their reverberating effects, when assessing an attack's compliance with the prin-
ciple of proportionality. This will require planning, legal, and computer experts 
to operate in concert throughout the targeting cycle. lOS 
Finally, much as CNA challenges existing notions of "at tack," it will also test 
traditional understanding of combatant status. This results from the use of typi-
cally civilian technology and know-how to conduct military operations via 
computer. Failure to strictly comply with the limitations on the participation of 
civilians in hostilities will inevitably lead to heightened endangerment of the ci-
vilian population and weaken humanitarian law norms. 
So the jury remains out. While humanitarian law in its present form generally 
suffices to safeguard those it seeks to protect from the effects of computer net-
work attack, and even though it offers the promise of periodically enhancing 
such protection, significant prescriptive fault lines do exist. Thus, as capabilities 
to conduct computer network attacks increase, both in terms of sophistication 
and availability, continued normative monitoring is absolutely essential. We 
must avoid losing sight of humanitarian principles, lest the possible in warfare 
supplant the permissible. 
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this?" and asked Milosovic the same question. 
Craig R. Whitney, TIle Commander: Air Wars Won't Stay Risk-Free, General Says, THE NEW 
YORK TIMES, June 18, 1999, at At. 
104. PROTOCOLS ADDITIONAL COMMENTARY, supra note 26, para. 1871, notes that "it is 
the duty of Parties to the conflict to have the means available to respect the rules of the Protocol. In 
any case, it is reprehensible for a Party possessing such means not to use them, and thus consciously 
prevent itself from making the required distinction." 
1 05. A typical Information Operations cell is illustrated inJ oint Pub 3-13, supra note 2, at figure 
IV -4 and accompanying text. It includes an 10 officerfromJ-3; representatives fromJ-2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 
supporting combatant commands, and service and functional components; ajudge advocate; and 
public affairs, counterintelligence, civil affairs, targeting, special operations, special technical 
operations, electronic warfare, psychological operations, military deception, and operations 
security experts. 
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